This paper examines the market structure of Vietnam's banking sector during 1999-2009, which is after the introduction of the two-tier banking system, using the non-structural (Panzar-Rosse) model. We consider a more comprehensive range of specifications, in terms of a greater number of environmental covariates and different dependent variables, than in previous applications of this model. Further, this is the first study that uses lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity), excludes assets (to avoid specification bias) and includes a lagged dependent variable (to avoid dynamic panel bias) in such a study of the Vietnamese banking system. We find that the Vietnamese banking system operates in monopoly.
Introduction
In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of the degree of market competition in the Vietnamese banking system using the Panzar and Rosse (1987) non-structural model. This model suggests that the market is a monopoly if the service offered by a particular bank is independent and originate. In contrast, the market is competitive if bank services are similar in the market. We apply the non-structural model to an extensive panel data set of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks, which includes state owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks, from 1999 to 2009. Using this procedure we consider whether the Vietnamese banking market is best characterised by monopoly, perfect competition or the intermediate case of monopolistic competition.
We estimate H-statistics of models that both include assets and exclude assets with current or lagged input prices. We also estimate E-statistics to test whether the long-run equilibrium conditions required for the H-statistics to be valid hold when using the fixed-effects estimator within the equilibrium approach. A comparison of models using current and lagged input prices is employed to assess whether input prices are endogenous. This is the first study that uses lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) and excludes assets (to avoid bias) in a study of the Vietnamese banking system. This study also extends the previous literature (Bikker et al., 2006a , 2006b and Bikker and Spierdijk, 2009 ) by considering new additional variables such as total assets, capital/assets, loans/deposits and the number of branches in the model's specification. In addition, we compare inference using four alternative dependent variables being revenue/assets, interest income/assets, revenue and interest income. However, the main contribution of this paper is to determine the market structure in the recent period after the Vietnamese banking system has transformed into a less centralised two-tier system. Our study is the first to uniquely identify the market structure of this developing economy's banking system (using data only for Vietnam and not observations from other countries) in a post-transition period. 3 Another novelty of the paper is to assess the biases that arise from model misspecification, in particular, biases dues to endogeneity, including assets and not accounting for a potential dynamic specification.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section 2 deals with developments in the Vietnamese banking system in the period from 1986 to 2009; section 3 provides a literature review of the non-structural model in banking; section 4 discusses methodology and data; section 5 presents our empirical results, and section 6 concludes.
The Vietnamese banking system during 1986-2009
From 1986 to 2009 the Vietnamese banking system was transformed from a mono to two-tier banking system. The two-tier banking system has the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) as the central bank (tier 1) and four specialised state owned banks (tier 2). Table 1 had a license to set up a wholly foreign-owned bank from 2008 (see Nguyen and Stewart, 2013) . Table 2 shows data on loans, assets, deposits, capital and non-performing loans of the Vietnamese banking system (state owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) from 1999 to 2009. On the whole, there was an increasing trend of loans, assets, deposits and capital over the period.
Vietnamese banks were burdened by a high volume of non-performing loans, particularly during the 1990s, however, these generally decreased from 1999 to 2009. Non-performing loans of non-state owned commercial banks are typically lower than those of state owned commercial banks.
In terms of regulation, the State Bank of Vietnam aims to create a banking supervision development In parallel with the speed of the country's economic development, the loan growth rate rose dramatically. One of the reasons was that many banks had greatly increased their credit growth through real estate loans, due to the over-heating of the real estate market. The credit growth rate of the banking system increased to nearly 38 per cent in 2007 and peaked at an alarming 63 per cent in the first quarter of 2008 (WB, 2008: 3) . This has been the highest growth rate within the past decade. When the inflation rate and trade balance deficit had become more serious, the government applied a traditional tightening of monetary policy in order to reduce money supply circulation, which affected the banking system.
Compulsory measures were necessary for banks to reorganise and strengthen their organisations.
Literature review
Empirical studies that use the non-structural model to establish the extent of contestability in banking markets are concerned with drawing inferences about market structure indirectly from observing conduct. This is because of contestability, which depends on the extent of potential competition, is not observable directly (Goddard et al., 2001) . Panzar and Rosse (1987) formulated simple models for monopolistic, oligopolistic and perfectly competitive markets, and develop a test to discriminate between these market structures. Bikker and Bos (2008) explained this non-structural model as based on the properties of a reduced-form revenue equation at the firm or bank level and using the H-statistic, which, under certain assumptions, can serve as a measure of how competitive banks are. The test is from a general banking model, which determines equilibrium output and the equilibrium number of banks by maximizing profits at both the bank level and the industry level. This implies, first, that bank i maximises its profits, where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The profit maximising condition is:
Ri refers to revenue, Ci to cost, Yi to output, wi to a vector of m factor input prices, and Zi and Ti to vectors of exogenous variables that shift the bank's revenue and cost functions, respectively. The sub index i refers to bank i; n is the number of banks; and the prime symbol denotes a first derivative with respect to output. Second, at the market level, it means that, in equilibrium, the zero supernormal profit constraint holds:
Variables marked with an asterisk (*) represent equilibrium values. Market power is measured by the extent to which a change in factor input prices (dwk,i) for k = 1,..., m is reflected in changes in equilibrium revenue (dR*i), earned by bank i (where m denotes the number of input prices). Panzar and Rosse (1987) defined a measure of competition H as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenue function with respect to factor prices:
The first market model that Panzar and Rosse investigate is a monopoly. In their analysis, monopoly includes the case of price-taking competitive banks, as long as the prices they face are truly exogenous, that is, as long as their equilibrium values are unaffected by changes in the other exogenous variables in the model. The empirical refutation of monopoly constitutes a rejection of the assumption that the revenue of the banks in question is independent of the decisions made by their actual or potential rivals.
The Panzar and Rosse model demonstrates that under monopoly, an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output and subsequently reduce revenue; hence H will be zero or negative. In the case of monopolistic competition, the analysis is based on the comparative static properties of the Chamberlain equilibrium model. In the equilibrium condition, interdependence affects the structural revenue function, and the bank's profit finally becomes zero as the conditions of entry and withdrawal are unlimited; hence H will be smaller than one. In the case of perfect competition, under certain conditions both marginal cost and average cost increase without changing the optimum amount of the individual bank's output. If this condition occurs and some banks withdraw from the market, the remaining banks would individually face increased demand. This increased demand leads to higher prices and revenue, which is equal to the increase of cost, and H will become one. In summary:
 H ≤ 0: indicates a monopoly. The model used for calculating the H-statistic has taken a variety of specific forms in the general banking literature. Molyneux et al. (1994) and Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) employed the ratio of interest revenue to the total balance sheet as an endogenous variable. Molyneux et al. (1994) (2000), this is the most appropriate measure since the ratio of interest revenue to total assets might be interpreted as yielding a price equation rather than a revenue function. However, homogeneity might be induced even in the logarithmic specification. DeBandt and Davis (2000) insisted that in empirical studies on banking competition, although cross-sectional results are generally employed, the implicit assumption is that all banks have access to the same factor market and only the scale of operations differ. They argued that the dimension of the time-series is crucial, and that irregular results might arise from estimating a crosssectional regression of the equation with Ordinary Least Squares for every year (t=1, …T). As a result, they asserted that it is desirable to focus on the pooled sample regression.
In Vietnam, three previous studies have applied the Panzar-Rosse model to the Vietnamese banking system. Bikker et al. (2006a Bikker et al. ( , 2006b ) and Bikker and Spierdijk (2009) commercial banks still dominate the whole banking system. Further, they could not observe the three input prices directly. Therefore, they used the ratio of annual personal expenses to total assets as an approximation for the price of personal expenses, and the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed assets as a proxy for the price of capital expenditure. Moreover, Bikker et al. (2006a Bikker et al. ( , 2006b ) and Bikker and Spierdijk (2009) preferred interest income as the dependent variable, while other researchers, such
as Nathan and Neave (2001) , favour using revenue in the Panzar-Rosse model. Hence, for comparison purposes we will use both interest income and revenue as dependent variables in this paper.
Our data set includes 48 Vietnamese commercial banks over the period 1999 to 2009. This is the first time that such an extensive panel data set has been employed to uniquely identify the Vietnamese banking system's market structure using the non-structural model (our maximum sample period is 376 observations). No previous study has used lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) and excluded assets (to avoid bias) in a study of the Vietnamese banking system. Environmental factors such as total assets, capital/assets, loans/deposits and the number of branches are incorporated in our models and have not all been employed in previous studies of Vietnam. In addition, for comparative purposes, we use the following four different dependent variables: revenue divided by total assets (REV/TA); interest income divided by total assets (INT/TA); revenue (REV); and interest income (INT). We use the nonstructural model to determine whether the Vietnamese banking system is best characterised by monopoly, monopolistic competition or perfect competition.
Methodology and data

Calculating H-statistics
We estimate non-structural models based on the Panzar-Rosse specification using the following empirical form:
where, LN(ROAi,t) is bank i's revenue, which is initially measured in two ways: the natural logarithm of revenue divided by total assets ) ( is the loans to deposits ratio; LN(TAi,t) is the natural logarithm of total assets and LN(BRi,t) is the natural logarithm of the number of branches.
The H-statistic, which is used to determine the degree of competition, is calculated from (4) using:
From equation (5), if H ≤ 0 the market is a monopoly, if 0 < H < 1 the market is in monopolistic competition and if H = 1 the market is in perfect competition.
Models with and without assets
Many previous empirical studies include among the controls the log of assets, should be removed from the right-hand side of the models (Goddard and Wilson, 2009) . 6 The valid unscaled model (that we also estimate) is obtained from (4) with 6 = 0 and using the unscaled dependent variables, 
Calculating E-statistics (testing equilibrium)
For the H-statistic to be a valid test it must be calculated on observations that are in long-run equilibrium. This suggests that competitive capital markets will equalise risk-adjusted rates of return across banks such that, in equilibrium, rates of returns should not be significantly correlated with input prices (Classens and Laeven, 2004; Lloyd-Williams et al., 1994; Matthews et al., 2007; Forbes, 1995 and Shaffer, 1982) . Thus, in the context of the theory of competitiveness and contestability set out in (4) we specify a model for the determination of whether equilibrium holds. This is obtained by replacing the dependent variable in (4) with profit before tax on assets (1+PBT/TA) thus: 7 
A version of (6) without is also estimated by setting
The E-statistic that is used for testing whether the market is in equilibrium is defined as:
We test whether E = 0 using an F-test. If rejected, the market is not in equilibrium (Claessens and Laeven, 2004) , whereas if E = 0 the market is in equilibrium and the H-statistic calculated using (4) and (5) is valid.
Models with current and lagged input prices
Simultaneity is a dual direction of causality in a system of equations which violates the assumption that the explanatory variables and equation's error term are uncorrelated. Variables in a regression can 6 In this study, we estimate models that both include and exclude assets for comparison purposes. 7 Because profit before tax can take on small (negative) values, we compute the dependent variable as (1+PBT/TA).
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violate this assumption for several reasons, including omitted variable bias, measurement error and simultaneity/reverse causation. In our regression, the models including the current values of input prices might suffer from simultaneity (endogeneity) bias between input prices and the dependent variables (revenue and interest income). We assess whether or not one or more of the input prices (LN(IE/FF), LN(PE/TE) and LN(CE/FA)) suffers from endogeneity by comparing regressions that include current input prices and regressions that include lagged input prices -see Shaffer (2004) and Goddard and Wilson (2009) . To obtain models using lagged input prices the current price variables are replaced by their values lagged one time period in (4) and (6). Large differences in the estimated coefficients (and therefore H-statistics and E-statistics) using models with current input prices and using models with lagged input prices is taken as an indication of the endogeneity. If endogeneity appears evident inference from models that incorporate lagged input prices is preferred.
Model estimation
Econometric problems may arise from estimating equation (4) using panel data including the process being dynamic, with current realisations of the dependent variable being influenced by its past values, and that the idiosyncratic disturbances may have individual-specific patterns of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. To address these issues a generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator, such as that introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) and those discussed by Roodman (2009) , may be used when lagged dependent variables are added. The difference and system GMM estimators can be applied using either the one-step method or the two-step method.
After experimentation to find a valid specification we report the results from the one-step system GMM estimator with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust coefficient standard errors (results from the other estimators are available upon request).
The pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimators applied to a model that includes a lagged dependent variable and that should allow for cross-sectional fixed-effects have the following properties. The (pooled) OLS estimator that excludes fixed-effects will be inconsistent when T is small (even when N is large) and the lagged dependent variable's coefficient will be upwards biased. 8 The fixed-effects estimator will also be inconsistent when T is small and there is a downward bias in the lagged dependent variable's coefficient. Since the bias on the lagged dependent variable for the pooled OLS and fixedeffects estimators are in the opposite direction we expect the true coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to fall in between these two estimators' values. 9 When using GMM, Hansen's J-statistic is employed to assess whether the instruments are exogenous whilst allowing for heteroscedastic and autocorrelated disturbances. 10 Since this test is biased towards accepting that the instruments are exogenous as the number of instruments increases we follow Roodman's (2009) recommendation and ensure that the number of instruments is less than the number of cross-sections in the panel to help guard against this potential problem.
Data
In this paper, annual individual balance sheets and income statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks from 1999 to 2009 have been collected from the State Bank of Vietnam, National Library of Vietnam and individual banks. Although the number of banks for which there is data is only half of the total in the Vietnamese banking system they account for more than 90 per cent of total customer loans, total customer deposits and total assets. 11 Table 3 reports the non-structural model estimated for the full sample using the fixed-effects estimator.
Empirical results
The results include estimated revenue equations (in the column headed "H-statistics") and profit 8 The GMM estimators assume small T and large N in the panel. Hence, the GMM estimators are consistent as N tends to infinity and not as T tends to infinity. When T is large, dynamic models using the pooled OLS or fixed-effects estimators are consistent meaning that there is little benefit from using GMM (which can become unreliable when T is large due to the overfitting of endogenous variables). 9 In our application T is small and we expect both the OLS and fixed-effects estimators to be biased. 10 In the application of GMM, the Sargan test has a null hypothesis of "the instruments as a group are exogenous". Therefore, the higher is the p-value of the Sargan statistic the better the result is. In robust estimation, Stata reports the Hansen statistic instead of the Sargan test and both tests have the same null hypothesis. The Arellano -Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. The test for AR(2) in first differences is important because it will detect autocorrelation in levels. These models are valid when these tests' p-values are higher than 0.05 (see Roodman, 2009) equations (in the column headed "E-statistics") using all measures of the dependent variable with current or lagged input prices both with and without assets.
1 0 H refers to the F-test of the null hypothesis that cross-sectional fixed-effects are redundant. 2 0 H refers to the F-test of the null hypothesis that both cross-sectional and time-period fixed-effects are redundant. All of the F-tests reject the exclusion of cross-sectional and period fixed-effects, therefore, the '2-way-FE' model is favoured and reported in the table. 12 We also report R 2 , the adjusted R 2 (Adj R 2 ), the statistic for testing the null hypothesis that R 2 = 0 (F-statistic) and the number of observations. indicates that the Vietnamese banking system is a competitive industry. 13 Comparing the models with and without assets we notice that excluding total assets from the revenue equations has transformed our inference of the Vietnamese banking market from monopolistic competition to perfect competition. This is consistent with the prediction of Bikker et al. (2006a) and Goddard and Wilson (2009) Further, these H-statistics are notably smaller than the corresponding equations that use current input prices, being 0.96-0.98. This difference is most likely due to simultaneity bias. 14 Hence we favour the results using lagged input prices and without assets for inference and conclude that the Vietnamese banking system is in monopolistic competition. Table 3 also shows the results of the profit equations and their E-statistics for the full sample (in the column headed "E-statistics"). The E-statistic is used to determine whether the long-term equilibrium condition of the market is met. If the E-statistic is equal to zero the market is in long-term equilibrium whereas when the E-statistic is not equal to zero the market is not in long-term equilibrium. If the market is not in equilibrium the value of the H-statistic (obtained from the corresponding revenue equation) is temporal and the degree of competitiveness is changing through time. In this case, the estimated models are not valid for inference and it is appropriate to employ a dynamic model to determine the equilibrium value of the market. We use the '2-way-FE' specification for inference because both crosssection and time-period fixed-effects are jointly significant according to the 1 0 H and 2 0 H F-tests. The Estatistic in the '2-way-FE' models are 0.007 (with assets and with current input prices), 0.006 (without assets and with current input prices), 0.007 (with assets and with lagged input prices) and 0.003 (without assets and with lagged input prices). In all cases, the null hypothesis that the Vietnamese banking system is in equilibrium is not rejected. Hence, all the corresponding H-statistics are valid. Due to simultaneity bias in the models using current input prices and the misspecification of the models that include assets (see, Bikker et al., 2006a; Goddard and Wilson, 2009) We also note the following findings from the favoured models estimated over the full sample. The unit cost of funds (LN(IE/FF)) is positive and significant at the one per cent level for both dependent variables.
The unit price of labour (LN(PE/TE)) is positive and significant at the 10 per cent level in the model where revenue is the dependent variable and insignificant when interest income is the regressand. The unit cost of fixed assets (LN(CE/FA)) is insignificant in the models with both dependent variables. These results suggest that the unit cost of funds has the most significant impact on revenue and interest 14 Unreported results (that are available from the authors upon request) using the Wu-Hausman test broadly confirm that current input prices are unlikely to be weakly exogenous.
income of the three input prices. These favoured specifications also indicate that customer loans over customer deposits (CL/CD) and total capital over total assets (TC/TA) are negative and significant while the number of branches (LN(BR)) is positive and significant. Table 4 reports the revenue equations estimated using the one-step system GMM estimator (for models excluding assets and including lagged input prices) over the full sample period. Time period fixed effects are included in both models (because F-tests reject their exclusion for both models) however the statistics relating to these variables are not reported to save space. To investigate misidentifying restrictions, we employ the Hansen (Sargan) test which indicates the null hypothesis that the population moment conditions are correct is not rejected as p=0.110>0.05 (where LN(REV) is dependent variable) and p=0.107>0.05 (where LN(INT) is dependent variable). The test for first-order serial correlation (probability values are reported in the row labelled AR(1) in Table 4 ) does not indicate whether the model is misspecified because first-order negative autocorrelation is expected when using panel GMM.
Hence, our finding of evident first-order autocorrelation is expected and does not cause us to view either of the models given in Table 4 as invalid. We therefore follow conventional practice and focus on the test for second-order serial correlation to determine whether the model is valid or not (see Roodman, 2009 ). 15 The probability value for the test for second-order serial correlation (AR(2)) is 0.715 in the model where revenue is dependent variable and 0.757 in the model where interest income is dependent variable indicating no evident autocorrelation. Hence, both models are considered valid for inference.
Further, for both equations the lagged dependent variable is significant which indicates that these models estimated by GMM should be preferred to those using the fixed-effects estimators as reported in Table 3 . Goddard and Wilson (2009 , pp. 2285 -2286 provided simulation evidence that the difference GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) , in a model with a lagged dependent variable, is better at identifying the H-statistic compared to the fixed-effects estimator (in a model without a lagged dependent variable) when the true coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is greater than zero, which is the case in our study.
15 "To test for autocorrelation aside from the fixed effects, the Arellano-Bond test is applied to the residuals in differences. Because Δvit [the difference of the current period error term] is mathematically related to Δvi,t−1 via the shared vi,t−1 term, negative first-order serial correlation is expected in differences and evidence of it is uninformative. Thus to check for first-order serial correlation in levels, we look for second-order correlation in differences, on the idea that this will detect correlation between the vi,t−1 in Δvit and the vi,t−2 in Δvi,t−2. In general, we check for serial correlation of order l in levels by looking for correlation of order l + 1 in differences." Roodman (2009, p. 119) , our comments are given in squared parentheses.
Our estimated H-statistics based on the model estimated by fixed-effects (without assets and including lagged input prices) that imposes 0 7   are reported in Table 3 as 0.453 and 0.430. The H-statistics based on the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator that allows 0 7   are reported in Table   4 as -1.283 and -2.984. We find that the fixed-effects estimates of the H-statistic are smaller in magnitude than the system GMM estimates, which is consistent with the bias predicted when 0 7   .
Since our system GMM estimates of 7  reported in Table 4  by system GMM reported in Table 4 are 0.75 and 0.83. If these estimates are regarded as sufficiently close to unity to cause bias it means that our Hstatistics are smaller in absolute value than they should be. Given that our H-statistics are negative this suggests that they are not as negative as they should be. This can only reinforce our conclusion of a negative H-statistic. It also means that the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the H-statistic is equal to one may not be as negative as it should be and it may be that our failure to reject this hypothesis for the equation where LN(INT) is the dependent variable is due to this bias. Hence, to the extent that our results are subject to such bias they serve to reinforce our inference that the Vietnamese banking system is monopolistic.
The model with the dependent variable LN(REV) is reported in column 2 of Table 4 . The H-statistic is negative (-1.28) and is not significantly different from zero however it is significantly different from one.
16 Wilson (2009, p. 2285) suggested that the test for the null of the H-statistic being equal to unity will be oversized (suggesting that the null hypothesis will be rejected too often) when the true value of 7  is close to one. This is because they only consider the situation when the sum of the input price coefficients,
, is positive. However, when this sum is negative, as is the case for our estimates, the test will not reject the null as often as it should (because the H-statistic will not be as negative as it should be). The model where the dependent variable is LN(INT) is reported in column 3 of Table 4 . The H-statistic is negative (-2.98) which, as is the case when LN(REV) is the dependent variable also indicates that Vietnamese banking system is monopolistic. However, because the H-statistic is not significantly different from either one or zero this statistic is not well determined and suggests caution with this interpretation. Nevertheless, since the point estimate of the H-statistic is negative and because the model with LN(REV) is well determined and clearly negative, we believe that the overall conclusion of a monopolistic Vietnamese banking system over the period 1999 to 2009 is convincing.
We recall that the favoured models from Table 3 (that exclude assets and include lagged input prices) suggest that the Vietnamese banking system is in monopolistic competition. However, these models exclude a statistically significant lagged dependent variable and are therefore not valid. When the statistically significant lagged dependent variable is included, as is done in Table 4 , the results suggest that the Vietnamese banking system is monopolistic. Hence, we have demonstrated that not accounting for this significant lagged dependent variable will bias the results and lead to inferring monopolistic competition when the banking system is monopolistic.
Conclusion
In this paper, the Panzar-Rosse model has been applied in order to investigate the degree of competition faced by cooperative financial institutions in Vietnam. Our paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, our results are based upon the largest sample both in terms of the number of banks and total sample size compared to any previous study of non-structural models in the Vietnamese banking system and ours is the first to clearly isolate the market structure for Vietnam from other countries. Second, this study also extends the previous literature by considering new additional variables. Environmental factors such as total assets, capital/assets, loans/deposits and the number of branches that are incorporated in our models have not been employed in previous studies of Vietnam. Further, we use four different dependent variables to provide comparative inference. Third, this is also the first study that considers the exclusion of assets (to avoid specification bias) and the inclusion of lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) in a study of the Vietnamese banking system. Fourth, we also compare the OLS/fixed-effects estimators with the GMM estimator (where the model includes a lagged dependent variable) for the Vietnamese banking system and find that choosing the most appropriate (GMM in our case) is important because it substantively changes the conclusions drawn. This represents a further novelty of our paper. The favoured OLS/fixed effect estimators suggest that the Vietnamese banking system is in monopolistic competition. However, incorrectly including assets and/or current input prices can affect the results and, in some cases, lead to the erroneous conclusion that the Vietnamese banking system is perfectly competitive. Furthermore, we found that accounting for a significant lagged dependent variable, as is achieved when using the GMM estimator, indicates that the Vietnamese banking system is monopolistic. Hence, not accounting for significant dynamics also biases inference. Our results illustrate the importance of correctly specifying the model to achieve the most reliable inference because all 3 market structures (perfect competition, monopolistic competition and monopoly) can be inferred depending upon which model is used. The significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable confirms the dynamic character of the model specifications for Vietnamese banks.
Using the correctly specified model that uses lagged input prices, excludes assets and includes a lagged dependent variable suggests that the whole Vietnamese banking system is characterised by monopoly from 1999 to 2009. Our results for Vietnam are different from those for the EU countries found in previous works. Our results show that the Vietnamese banking system is monopolistic while other studies found that European banking sectors operate under conditions of monopolistic competition Bikker and Groeneveld, 2000; Bikker et al., 2006a , 2006b and Bikker and Spierdijk, 2009 ). In Vietnam, three out of five state owned commercial banks accounted for 45 per cent of customer deposits, 41 per cent of total assets and 51 per cent of customer loans of the banking system in 2009 (see Nguyen and Stewart, 2013) . From 1999 to 2009, five state owned commercial banks still dominated the whole banking system although non-state owned commercial banks exhibited greater overall technical efficiency than state owned commercial banks (see Stewart et al., 2016) .
A number of policy implications arise out of this paper. We argue that the monetary policy tightening that began in 2008 had a large impact on the banking system in terms of compulsory reserves, loans and deposits. Generally, the banking system encounters many difficulties, resulting from the loss of balance in the source and use of funds, and the rapid increase in credit growth (see Nguyen and Stewart, 2013) .
Hence, macroeconomic policies from the State Bank of Vietnam should be used to simultaneously meet the high demand of loans from the public and to control rising inflation brought about by a rapid increase in credit growth. We also find that banks that open more branches increase their revenue. Thus, the State Bank of Vietnam should consider introducing policies to enhance the development of commercial banks to raise competition and revenue in the banking system. Sources: Dufhues (2003) , SBV (2005 ) and VCSC (2008 . 
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